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We show some incompleteness results à la Chaitin using the busy beaver functions. Then, with
the help of ordinal logics, we show how to obtain a theory in which the values of the busy beaver
functions can be provably established and use this to reveal a structure on the provability of the values
of these functions.
1 Introduction
When considering a class of Turing machines that halt when started from a blank tape, busy beavers for
that class, as coined by Tibor Radó, are those Turing machines which eventually halt after the maximum
number of steps (or after producing the maximum number of non-blank symbols). Finding for a class of
Turing machines the busy beaver champion (for any of the two competitions) is of course uncomputable
[19]. Nevertheless, efforts have been made to try to find the champions starting with the smallest classes
of Turing machines. Finding all the different kinds of behavior of Turing machines in a class is quite
exhilarating an endeavor. Rona J. Kopp [9] and Allen H. Brady [3] have thoroughly studied the four states
and two symbols class and Heiner Marxen and others [15, 16] have tried for more than two decades to
experimentally find the busy beaver champion for the five states and two symbols class. Heiner Marxen
found a candidate but no one has been able to prove that no other machine does better. This is most
certainly because the behaviors involved are too complicated. This state of affairs is an encouragement
to the study of what we have called low-level reverse computability: What does it take to be able to
comprehend the behavior of a certain class of Turing machines? What is needed to be able to prove these
behaviors? These questions raise the links between the study of busy beavers and incompleteness.
To start off, there is a need to see the strong links between computability and incompleteness. For
instance, one can obtain a first form of the first incompleteness theorem by considering propositions of
the form n 6∈ X , where X is a non-recursive but recursively enumerable set, e.g., the diagonal halting set
K . Even if the language of the considered theory does not contain ∈, there is a simple algorithm that
generates given n the proposition “n 6∈ X”. Given a sound (every provable statement is true) recursively
enumerable theory T , there is a number n0 such that n0 6∈ X but T does not prove it. The proof is direct:
Suppose that there is no such n0, then we would have that T proves “n 6∈ X” if and only n 6∈ X , and X
would be recursive (generate the theorems of T and at the same time enumerate X ; if n ∈ X then n will
eventually show up in the enumeration; otherwise, “n 6∈ X” will eventually show up in the theorems of T
and be true by the soundness assumption). We thus have a true sentence, “n0 6∈ X”, which is not provable
in T .
∗We acknowledge the support of the French National Research Agency Sycomore grant.
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Incompleteness is also famously linked to computability via Chaitin’s incompleteness theorem.
Chaitin’s result, showing that there are unprovable statements on Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity1, is a
form of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Actually, Kolmogorov showed in the sixties that the set
of random (or incompressible) numbers, i.e., {x : K(x)> x}, is recursively enumerable but not recursive,
and, by the above argument, this is already a version of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Moreover,
Kolmogorov’s proof can be seen as an application of Berry’s paradox (“the least integer not nameable
in fewer than seventy characters” has just now been named in sixty-three characters). Following Boolos
[1], it is thus no wonder that we can get proofs using this Kolmogorov complexity function (or other
similar computability-related functions) of both incompleteness theorems (see [10]).
One of the reasons of the existence of the quest for better understanding the incompleteness phe-
nomenon lies in the peculiarity of Gödel’s unprovable statements. They are not natural mathematical
statements: no mathematician has ever stumbled on them (or should we say over them ?). And thus, it
seems to many that normal mathematical practice is not concerned with the incompleteness phenomenon.
More and more results show however the contrary. In particular, Harvey Friedman’s Π01 statements, that
are unprovable in Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory and need the 1-consistency of strong set-theoretical
unprovable statements (going way beyond ZF) to be proved, are examples of such results.
Nevertheless, incompleteness theorems only provide unprovable statements like the consistency of
a theory, that are of an unclear nature. What combinatorial properties does the consistency statement
bring to a theory? Having a link between consistency (or soundness) and computability, in particular
Kolmogorov complexity, would make possible an understanding of what properties consistency adds to
a theory. Adding consistency as an axiom would then yield new combinatorial properties because of the
existing links between combinatorics and Kolmogorov complexity. For a detailed exposition of the links
between Gödel incompleteness and Kolmogorov complexity, see [10].
In the first part of this article, we start by giving an incompleteness theorem à la Chaitin using the
busy beaver functions and then make precise the kind of incompleteness theorems one can obtain with
them. In the second part, we use ordinal logics to construct a theory in which the values of the busy
beaver functions can be provably established and use this to find a structure on the provability of the
values of these functions.
Notational conventions
On top of the usual logical connectives (∧, ∨ and ¬), we will respectively denote the logical connectives
of implication and equivalence by 3 and ≡.
When we have a recursively enumerable axiomatic theory T , ConsT designates the arithmetical sen-
tence that there is no proof of 0 = 1. When the axioms of T are defined by a formula φ , Cons(φ) will
1Loosely speaking, the Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity of a natural number n, denoted by K(n), is the smallest size of a
program which generates n.
Another useful variant of Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity can be defined as follows. To each enumeration {ϕi}i∈N of
computable partial functions, we associate a variant of K: Kϕ (x|y) = smallest e such that ϕe(y) = x, and Kϕ (x) = Kϕ (x|0).
Chaitin’s version of Gödel incompleteness is the following theorem.
Theorem 1.1 (Chaitin’s incompleteness). Let T be an arithmetical-able consistent theory. There is a constant cT such that for
all x, “K(x)> cT ” is unprovable in T .
For more on Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity, the reader is referred to [14]. For a formal definition of arithmetical-ability,
see [10].
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designate ConsT using that formalization. The provability predicate is designated by ProvT .
The partial recursive functions computed by Turing machines, following a fixed convention, are
denoted by {ϕi}i∈N (agreeing with the Turing machines’ coding: ϕi is the partial function computed
by Ti). The sets {Wi}i∈N denote the recursively enumerable sets, i.e., the domains of partial recursive
functions.
Concerning computability, the reader is referred to [17, 18, 21, 20, 23, 25].
2 Incompleteness and busy-beaverhood
In the sixties, Tibor Radó, a professor at the Ohio State University, thought of a simple non-computable
function other than the standard halting problem for Turing machines. Given a fixed finite number of
symbols and states, select those Turing machines which eventually halt when run with a blank tape.
Among these programs, find the maximum number of non-blank symbols left on the tape when they halt.
Alternatively, find the maximum number of time steps before halting. These functions are well-defined
but uncomputable. Tibor Radó called them the busy beaver functions. For more on the busy beaver
problem, read [19, 11, 13, 2, 9, 3, 5, 6, 4, 16, 15, 12].
Alternative functions can be defined that are close in nature to these busy beaver functions. Let σ steps
be the function which to i gives the maximum number of steps for which a Turing machine with code 6 i
will keep running before halting, starting with a blank tape. For a Turing machine M, tM denotes the time
complexity function of M: tM(x) = s if M(x) halts after s steps. Following the busy beaver functions’
definitions, we define σ value to be the function which to i gives the maximum number which a Turing
machine with code 6 i will output, following a fixed convention, after halting starting with an input 6 i.
These functions are in a sense inverses of the Kϕ function (see footnote 1).
Other functions can be defined following classical Kolmogorov complexity, e.g., the function which
to n gives the biggest number with Kolmogorov complexity lower than n.
We call these functions the σ functions. For each variant, we can define a function focusing on
maximizing the number of steps, e.g., σ steps, or the output values, e.g., σ value. The value of either of
these functions on a certain x is computable from x and the value of the other function on input x+ c for
a certain constant c (see [22]).
A result similar to Chaitin’s incompleteness result concerning Kolmogorov complexity can be ob-
tained concerning the σ functions2 :
Theorem 2.1 (Chaitin-like incompleteness theorem for σ functions). Let σ be one of the σ functions.
Let T be an arithmetical-able3 consistent theory. There is a constant nσT such that
T ⊢ ConsT 3 ∀s¬ProvT (pσ(nσT )< sq). (1)
Proof. Consider a Π1 formula φσ in the language of T such that φσ (x,s) expresses that σ(x)< s.
Working in T , for a given x, take the smallest s such that ProvT (pφσ (x,s)q) holds. T being consistent
and φσ Π1, φσ (x,s) also holds.
2A σ function is any of the busy beaver functions defined above.
3For a formal definition of arithmetical-ability, see [10].
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ProvT (pφσ (x,s)q) is a Σ1 formula and thus can be seen as ∃yψ(x,s,y) or equivalently ∃〈s,y〉ψ(x,s,y)
where ψ is ∆0.
Thus there is a Turing machine computing ψ . Consider its code iψ (or its number of states or
transitions, depending on the choice of σ ). For large enough x, i.e., x > iψ + c, knowing that φσ (x,s)
holds (using the computation through shifting, i.e., the constant c, between both types of σ functions),
we know that σ(x) < s and thus there is an s′ = 〈s′1,s′2〉 < s such that ψ(x,s′1,s′2) holds. But for each
s′ = 〈s′1,s
′
2〉 smaller than s, the statement ¬ψ(x,s′1,s′2) is true by the minimality of s, and provable (being
∆0). Thus we have ¬ConsT .
We say that a statement φ is a revelation for T if φ is unprovable in T and its consistency relative to
T (if T is consistent, so is T +φ ) is provable from itself in T :
T ⊢ φ 3 ConsT (φ)
We have the following result showing how being able to prove an upper bound for a σ function can
be a revelation.
Theorem 2.2 (Serendipitous incompleteness theorem for σ functions). Let σ be one of the σ functions.
If T is consistent, then there exists a natural number rσT such that for all x, σ(rσT ) < x is a revelation
for T .
Proof. Consider the Π1 statement ∀x ψ(x)x equivalent to ConsT+φ .
ψ ∈ ∆0 and thus there is a machine Mψ with code iψ such that Mψ decides {x : ψ(x)x}: Mψ on input
x eventually enters an acceptance state if ψ(x)x, or a rejection state otherwise.
Consider another Turing machine M′ψ which runs Mψ successively on each natural number starting
from 0 and stops and writes the counter example of ψ if the simulation of Mψ enters a rejection state.
Let i′ψ be the code of Turing machine M′ψ . σ(i′ψ) makes the verification of ∀x ψ(x)x a ∆0 property.
By using Kleene’s recursion theorem on this previous construction, we find rσT such that knowing (or
bounding) the value of σ(rσT ) makes the verification of ConsT+σ(rσT )6x a ∆0 property. Knowing that T is
consistent and assuming σ(rσT )6 x, T thus proves ConsT (σ(rσT )6 x).
By Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, σ(rσT )6 x is an unprovable statement in T .
This can be done for other uncomputable functions, like Kolmogorov complexity functions (using
the Turing-completeness of their graphs). Truth-table completeness is a plus to be able to have a finite
revelation (finite number of constants cKi,T giving the revelation
∧
K(x)> cKi,T ).
The same idea can be used to find a constant T ′rσT such that if T and T ′ are consistent, then for all x,
T ⊢ σ(T ′rσT )< x3 1-ConsT ′ . This can be done for other soundness properties than 1-consistency.
By combining the proofs of the two previous theorems 2.1 and 2.2, we obtain :
Corollary 2.3 (Busy beaver pairs). Let σ be one of the σ functions. If T is consistent, then there exist
s
σ ,T
0 and s
σ ,T
1 such that for all x,
T ⊢ σ(sσ ,T0 )< x3∀s¬ProvT (pσ(s
σ ,T
1 )< s
q).
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3 Having enough power to comprehend busy beavers
We start by recalling the basic notions encompassing ordinal logics. We first need the notion of ordinal
notation.
Let 〈O ⊂ N,≺O, | · |〉 be defined inductively, simultaneously on ≺O and | · | : O → Ord, as follows:
0 ∈ O and |0|= 0;
If a ∈ O, then ς(a) = 〈a,0〉 ∈ O, a ≺O ς(a), and |ς(a)|= |a|+1;
If ϕe is a total function which is increasing according to ≺O (for all n, ϕe(n) ≺O ϕe(n+ 1)), then
ϑ(e) = 〈e,1〉 ∈ O, ϑ(e) ≻O ϕe(n) for all n, and |ϑ(e)| = limn∈ω |ϕe(n)|.
Elements of O are called notations. ς(a) denotes the successor of a, ϑ(e) the limit of e. O is called
the general ordinal representation system because every ordinal representation system is isomorphic
to Oa = {b ≺O a} for a particular a. Because of the definition of ϑ(e), assuming ϕe to be total and
increasing, ≺O is uncomputable, even not recursively enumerable.
Starting from a theory T , we can now define progressions of theories indexed by notations.
T0 = T
Tς(a) = T +Cons(T )
Tϑ (e) =
⋃
n Tϕe(n)
The idea is to have a sequence of theories indexed by ordinals showing how many times we assume
the consistency of the previous theories, the predecessor theory if the ordinal is a successor and all
previous theories if a limit ordinal. The difficulty lies in always having recursively enumerable axiomatic
theories, i.e., having a sequence of formulae φa defining the axioms of Ta and definable from previous φ ’s.
Turing [24] and later Feferman [7] came up with this idea of recursive progressions of theories. Kleene’s
second recursion theorem shows the existence of such recursive progressions. Notice that assuming the
soundness of the base theory T , if we add its consistency to the axioms of T , then we know that this
enhanced theory is also sound. Hence, soundness is inherited by consistency extensions.
Now, the problem is that Ta is not consistent for all a even when assuming the soundness of T : by
Kleene’s recursion theorem, there is e such that ϕe(0) = ς(ϑ(e)) and for such e, Tϑ (e) proves all that
Tς(ϑ (e)) proves, in particular ConsTϑ(e) ; thus Tϑ (e) is inconsistent.
To ensure that Ta is a consistency extension of T , one has to make sure that a belongs to O. One
way of doing that is working only with a’s from a branch of O, that is a linearly ordered subset of O
closed under ≺O. A better way is considering only notations, elements of O, such that if a ∈O and an
arithmetically definable variant of “b ∈ O” is provable in Ta then b ∈O.
In theorem 3.1 we use arguments along the lines of Turing’s [24] as they were described by Feferman
[7, 8].
Theorem 3.1 (Point-wise provability of σ values). Let σ be one of the σ functions. For any consistency
progression, for all a ∈O and for all x ∈N, there exists ax ∈ O with a ≺O ax such that |ax|= |a|+ω +1
and Tax proves all true statements of the form “σ(x)< · · ·”.
Proof. Consider a Π1 formula φσ (x,s) = ∀t ψσ (t,x,s) in the language of T such that φσ (x,s) expresses
σ(x)< s and ψσ is ∆0.
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Let σx be the true value of σ(x)+1. By Kleene’s recursion theorem, let ex be such that provably in
PA, for every n,
ϕex(n) =
{
ς n(a) if “ψ(piq,pxq,pσxq)” is true for every i ≤ n,
ς(ϑ(ex)) otherwise.
Since ∀t ψ(t,x,s) is true, ϑ(ex) ∈ O and |ϑ(ex)| = |a|+ω . Let ax = ς(ϑ(ex)). If ¬∀t ψ(t,x,s), then
Tϕex (n) is Ta for all sufficiently large n and so Tϑ (ex) also proves the consistency of Tϑ (ex). Thus by Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem, Tϑ (ex) is inconsistent. Hence, since we can prove in Tax the consistency
of Tϑ (ex), ∀t ψ(t,x,s) is also provable in Tax .
For any class of machines, it is thus possible with a combination of theories from a progression of
theories to comprehend the busy beaver functions on that class.
By an extensive use of Kleene’s recursion theorem and by varying the theory in the use of corollary
2.3, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2 (Busy beaver relationships). Let σ be one of the σ functions. If T is consistent, then for
all n > 1, there exist {sσ ,Ti }i<n such that for all s, σ(sσ ,T0 ) < s is not provable in T , and for all x and
i < (n−1),
T ⊢ σ(sσ ,Ti )< x3∀s¬ProvT (pσ(s
σ ,T
i+1 )< s
q).
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